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INTRODUCTION
California's prisons are massively overcrowded. The
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
has twelve reception centers.1 In 2008, all of the CDCR reception
centers except for one operated at near or over 200 percent de-
sign capacity. 2 Two of the reception centers operated at 300 per-
cent design capacity. 3 As a result, CDCR reception centers are
unable to adequately screen and treat the health problems of
inmates. 4 Moreover, doctor-patient confidentiality is greatly
compromised at CDCR facilities as health interviews and psycho-
logical examinations often are conducted in small offices.5 Sever-
al experts agree that overcrowding in CDCR facilities has made
providing appropriate physical and mental health care nearly
impossible.6 For example, these issues are particularly problem-
atic when considering that inmates during the last few years
have spent more time in CDCR reception areas than in the past.7
Thus, reception areas subject inmates to the negative effects of
overcrowding now more than ever.
Although inmates can seek redress in federal courts if state
prison conditions violate their constitutional rights,5 the legiti-
mate claims of inmates can be overlooked among so many pris-
oner complaints that are without merit. Prisoner litigation com-
prises a disproportionate share of filings in federal district
t AB 2008, Princeton University; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 Coleman v Schwarzenegger, 2009 WL 2430820, *35 (ED Cal).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id at *35.
5 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *36.
6 See generally id at *33-34.
7 Id at *37.
8 Jones v Block, 549 US 199, 203 (2007).
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courts.9 Including habeas corpus petitions and motions to vacate
a sentence, prisoner litigation constituted 24 percent of federal
civil filings in 2005.10 Congress sought to quell this problem with
the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PLRA"). n In order to reduce the frequency of frivolous claims
the PLRA mandates early judicial screening and exhaustion
requirements before cases can reach court.1 2 Consequently, most
litigation and scholarship surrounding the PLRA concerns the
Act's exhaustion requirement. 13
Recently, however, prisoners have made other elements of
the PLRA the subject of litigation-namely the parts of the Act
that concern injunctive relief and prisoner release orders. While
Congress enacted the PLRA predominantly as a means of
eliminating meritless lawsuits, the PLRA also places strict limits
on the remedies courts can offer inmates. Specifically, the PLRA
requires courts to conduct two main inquiries when determining
whether to issue prisoner release orders.
First, the court must determine that overcrowding is the
primary cause of the violation of a federal right.' 4 Second, a
prisoner release order can only be issued if it is a sufficiently
narrow and nonintrusive remedy for the violation.' 5 Determining
whether relief is sufficiently narrow requires an inquiry into
whether the relief to be ordered will be limited in scope and form.
Relief is sufficiently narrow in scope if it remedies only violations
that have been established by the plaintiffs. 16 The court's inquiry
into whether the form of relief is sufficiently narrow concerns
whether the relief to be ordered extends the court beyond its
proper authority or is too restrictive on the legislature imple-
menting the order. Taken together, these requirements are
commonly referred to as the "need-narrowness-intrusiveness"
9 Woodford v Ngo, 548 US 81, 94 n 4 (2006) (noting that between 2000 and 2005,
prisoner civil rights and prison conditions cases represented between 8.3 percent and 9.8
percent of the new filings in the federal district courts, averaging out to about one new
prisoner case every other week for each of the almost 1,000 active and senior district
judges).
10 Jones, 549 US at 203 n 1.
11 Pub L No 104-134, 110 Stat 1321-66 (1996).
12 Jones, 549 US at 203.
13 See, for example, Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 Emory L J 1771 (2003).
14 18 USC § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i).
15 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A).
16 See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *76.
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standard.1 7 Finally, the court must give adequate consideration
to how issuing a release order will affect the public. 18
While the PLRA lays out the "need-narrowness-
intrusiveness" standard, it is unclear what facts in a given case
courts should consider in determining whether the prospective
relief offered is sufficiently narrow in scope and form. In
Coleman v Schwarzenegger and Plata v Schwarzenegger19 the
court held that overcrowding was the primary cause of the viola-
tion of prisoners' constitutional rights.20 After consolidating the
cases, a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for
the Eastern and Northern Districts of California issued a prison-
er release order giving Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger forty-
five days to submit a prison population reduction plan for the
state.21 Explaining the PLRA standard for prospective relief, the
panel stated that the PLRA requirements are simply codifica-
tions of the common-law approach to injunctive relief.22 While
this appears to be the case for the public-interest inquiry, a care-
ful examination of case law reveals that the factors considered in
applying the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard in Cole-
man and Plata differ from the considerations used by some
courts at common law. In Coleman and Plata, the court looked
beyond the conditions of the prison the suing inmates inhabited
by looking to the prison system as a whole when determining
whether the relief was sufficiently narrow.23 In contrast, the
common-law approach, labeled as the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approach in Rhodes v Chapman,24 suggests that
only the cumulative effects of prison life and the interworking of
the prison or prison system at issue should be considered as part
of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness inquiry. 25
Whether a court can look beyond the conditions of the prison
or prison system at issue will have a direct effect on the court's
determination that a prison violates a constitutional right and
whether a prison release order is adequately narrow in scope and
17 Id.
18 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A).
19 2009 WL 330960, *1 (ED Cal) (consolidating Coleman v Schwarzenegger and Plata
v Schwarzenegger).
20 Id at *62.
21 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at* 116.
22 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *30 (quoting the legislative record describing the
PLRA as "not a departure from current jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief").
23 See generally id.
24 452 US 337 (1981).
25 Id at 362-63 (Brennan concurring).
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form. For example, the Coleman and Plata approach and the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach would yield different re-
sults as to whether the scope of relief is sufficiently narrow.
Since the totality-of-the-circumstances approach limits consider-
ation to the inner workings of prisons and prison systems, the
relief offered is narrowly tailored to the plaintiffs at suit. Con-
versely, the court in Coleman and Plata openly admitted that the
prisoner release order would directly affect prisoners who are not
members of the plaintiff class. It is clear that the factors courts
consider in examining the need-narrowness-intrusiveness re-
quirement will have a direct effect on whether courts issue a
prisoner release order and how prison systems are required to
implement the order.
While the decision in Coleman and Plata has brought
California to the forefront, prison overcrowding is an issue in
almost every state. As national prison populations increased in
2006, states increased spending on prisons by 10 percent.26 This
spending, however, decreased nationally as state budgets shrunk
in light of the economic downturn in late 2008.27 This decrease in
spending affected prisons directly; at least 26 states reduced
funding for retention facilities, leading to job cuts, changes in the
contents of prisoner meals, and a focus on alternatives to im-
prisonment. 28 In some instances, states have closed entire pris-
ons,29 leading to increased overcrowding in remaining facilities.
Consequently, as states cut funding for prisons it is very likely
that courts in states other than California will consider issuing
release orders.30
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part I provides an over-
view of the PLRA, Coleman, and Plata while focusing specifically
on the scope and form of relief elements of the "need-narrowness-
26 John Gramlich, States Seek Alternatives to More Prisons, Stateline.org (June 18,
2007), online at http/www.stateline.org/live/detailsfstory?contentId-217204 (visited Oct
3, 2010).
27 John Gramlich, At Least 26 States Spend Less on Prisons, Stateline.org (Aug 11,
2009), online at httpV/www.stateline.orglive/details/story?contentId=418338 (visited Oct
3, 2010).
28 Id.
29 Pamela M. Prah, States Plug Budget Holes, For Now, Stateline.org (Aug 17, 2009),
online at http;//www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=419384 (visited Oct 3,
2010).
30 On the growth of prison systems and the damage inflicted on prisoners by over-
crowding, see generally Craig Haney, The Wages of Prison Overcrowding: Harmful Psy-
chological Consequences and Dysfunctional Correctional Reactions, 22 Wash U J L & Pol
265 (2006) (describing Texas as experiencing rates of prison growth comparable to Cali-
fornia).
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intrusiveness" standard. Part II describes in greater detail the
differences in the common-law approach and the approach of the
three-judge panel in Coleman and Plata. Specifically, this section
examines how the differing approaches affect courts' determina-
tions of whether a prison system violates a constitutional right
and whether a prisoner release order is sufficiently narrow in
scope and tailored to the complaints brought forth by plaintiffs.
This section also discusses how the different approaches can re-
sult in varying determinations of whether a prisoner relief order
is narrow in form.
Part III offers a framework that courts can use to reconcile
the differing methods used by courts in determining whether to
issue prisoner release orders under the PLRA. This Comment's
proposed solution would force prisoner release orders to require
those prisoners whose constitutional rights the state is violating
to either be released from prison or receive increased medical
care as a direct result of other prisoners' release. The solution
helps ensure that the relief courts offer is narrow in scope by try-
ing to limit the effects of the relief granted to only members of
the plaintiff class and those persons affected by constitutional
violations. The proposed solution also ensures that remedies
are adequately narrow in form by limiting the considerations
that courts can take into account when issuing prisoner release
orders.
I. BACKGROUND: AN OVERVIEW OF THE PLRA AND THE
"NEED-NARROWNESS-INTRUSIVENESS" REQUIREMENT
A. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") limited
the circumstances under which a court may issue a "prisoner
release order" as a remedy in "any civil action with respect to
prison conditions."31 The PLRA represented a shift from broad
equity jurisdiction of the federal courts toward statutory guide-
lines limiting the circumstances for prisoner release orders.3 2 A
"prisoner release order" is defined as "any order, including a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief, that
has the purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison
31 18 USC § 3626(a)(3).
32 Gilmore v California, 220 F3d 987, 998-99 (9th Cir 2000).
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population, or that directs the release from or non-admission of
prisoners to a prison."33
Procedurally, a plaintiff seeking relief with respect to prison
conditions can request that a three-judge court issue a prisoner
relief order, or a federal judge can, sua sponte, "request the con-
vening of a three-judge court to determine whether a prisoner
release order should be entered."34 The PLRA only permits the
judge to request that a three-judge court convene under limited
circumstances, however, and also limits the circumstances under
which the three-judge court can issue a prisoner release order.
Specifically, the PLRA has three main requirements as to when
the three-judge can issue a release order. First, the PLRA states
that "no court shall enter a prisoner release order unless a court
has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that has
failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right sought to be
remedied through the prisoner release order."35 Second, a court
cannot issue a prisoner release order unless the defendant "has
had a reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous
court orders."36 Third, a court can only issue a prisoner release
order if it finds "by clear and convincing evidence" that "crowding
is the primary cause of the violation of a Federal right" and "no
other relief will remedy the violation of the Federal right."37
The PLRA further requires that a prisoner release order
(like all prospective relief ordered pursuant to the PLRA) be
"narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct
the violation of the Federal right, and [be] a the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right."38
Additionally, the PLRA states that courts must give "substantial
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation
of the criminal justice system" that would be caused by the
issuance of a prisoner release order.39
33 18 USC § 3626(g)(4).
34 18 USC § 3626(a)(3)(C) & (D).
35 18 USC § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
36 18 USC § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii).
37 18 USC § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) & (ii).
38 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A). See also Armstrong v Davis, 275 F3d 849, 872 (9th Cir
2001); Smith v Arkansas Department of Correction, 103 F3d 637, 645-46 (8th Cir 1996);
Williams v Edwards, 87 F3d 126, 133 n 21 (5th Cir 1996); compare with Lewis v Casey,
518 US 343, 357-60 (1996).
39 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A).
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B. "Need-Narrowness-Intrusiveness"
While the requirement that courts give consideration to pub-
lic safety is fairly straightforward, the "need-narrowness-
intrusiveness" requirement is less clear. The PLRA requires
courts to ensure that the prisoner release order requested by
plaintiffs extend no further than necessary to remedy the con-
stitutional violation.40  The need-narrowness-intrusiveness
inquiry is best understood as being composed of two elements:
scope of relief and form of relief.
1. Scope of relief.
The scope of relief element of the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness test is concerned with the breadth of relief courts
may give. When system-wide relief is requested by plaintiffs, the
critical inquiry for determining the proper scope of injunctive
relief is whether the established constitutional violation "is in
fact 'widespread enough to justify system wide relief.'"41 The
remedy that a court grants must be limited to the injuries estab-
lished by the plaintiffs in court.42 Thus, a system-wide remedy
like a prisoner release order is only acceptable if the plaintiffs
have established a system-wide injury.43
2. Form of relief.
An assessment of the proper form of relief takes into consid-
eration whether the court is using means that are beyond its
authority or too restrictive for implementation by the state. In
essence, this part of the test seeks to ensure confinement of
judicial power and respect for the discretionary authority of state
officials. 44 The form of relief must be sufficiently flexible to be the
least intrusive means necessary to correct the constitutional
violation at issue.45
40 See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *79 (stating that the PLRA and equitable prin-
ciples require the court to "ensure that the population reduction sought by plaintiffs ex-
tends no further than necessary to rectify the unconstitutional denial of medical and
mental health care to California's prisoners").
41 Armstrong, 275 F3d at 870, quoting Lewis, 518 US at 359.
42 Lewis, 518 US at 357-60 (1996) (explaining that the remedy in a prison conditions
case must address only actual injuries that have been identified by plaintiffs in court).
43 See, for example, Columbus Board of Education v Penick, 443 US 449, 465-67
(1979); Armstrong, 275 F3d at 870-72; Smith, 103 F3d at 645-46 (8th Cir 1996).
44 Bounds v Smith, 430 US 817, 832-33 (1977); Lewis, 518 US at 362-63.
45 See 18 USC §3626(a)(1)(A). See, for example, Lewis, 518 US at 362, quoting Bell v
Wolfish, 441 US 520, 562 (1979) (chiding the lower court for becoming "enmeshed in the
471] 477
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II. "NEED-NARROWNESS-INTRUSIVENESS" UNDER THE PLRA IN
COLEMAN AND THE "TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
While the PLRA as applied in Coleman and Plata is similar
to the common-law "totality-of-the-circumstances" considerations
for issuing prisoner release orders, there are significant differ-
ences between the two approaches. Specifically, the Coleman and
Plata approach permits courts to take into account factors be-
yond the conditions of the prison or prison system in the case at
hand when determining whether to grant injunctive relief.
Conversely, the common-law "totality-of-the-circumstances"
approach is much narrower and suggests that courts focus only
on the relative conditions within a prison or prison system.
A. The Coleman Court's Approach to "Need-Narrowness-
Intrusiveness" under the PLRA
In Coleman v Schwarzenegger, a three-judge court of the
Eastern and Northern Districts of California held that over-
crowding was the primary cause of the violation of prisoners'
constitutional rights.46 The panel issued a prisoner release order
giving Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger forty-five days to sub-
mit a prison population reduction plan for the state.47 The order
requires the plan to reduce the number of prisoners in facilities
operated by the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation ("CDCR") to 137.5 percent of the facilities' com-
bined design capacity within two years. 48 On September 11,
2009, Governor Schwarzenegger filed an application for a stay
with the United States Supreme Court concerning the panel or-
der.49 The three-judge district court indicated that it would not
implement its final order until the Supreme Court has reviewed
the district court's decree in Coleman v Schwarzenegger.
50
1. Plata and the establishment of unconstitutional health
care conditions.
The Plata prisoner relief order follows from the failure of the
California prisons to provide constitutionally adequate health
minutiae of prison operations" in fashioning an overly intrusive remedial order).
46 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *62.
47 Id at *116.
48 Id.
49 Schwarzenegger v Coleman, 130 S Ct 46, * 1 (2009).
50 Id.
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care for prisoners. 5' The plaintiffs argued that the inadequate
health care caused "severe and unnecessary pain, injury and
death" in the state's prisons.5 2 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the prisons were deficient because of inadequate medical
screening of incoming prisoners, delays in providing access to
medical care, slow response to medical emergencies, and an ina-
bility to maintain an adequate medical staff, among other prob-
lems.53 After the original Plata filing the parties stipulated to
injunctive relief that would initially require the defendants to
implement improved policies and procedures throughout seven
prisons in the state, with more prisons to follow. 54 Under the
stipulation the improvements only needed to meet the minimal
medical care required for prisoners under the Eight Amendment
of the Constitution.55
After years of noncompliance, the court issued an order to
show cause ("OSC") to the state of California to show why it was
not in civil contempt of the injunctive order. 56 The state claimed
that it had plans to outsource medical relief, but the court was
unsatisfied because such a plan would only become effective after
several years. 57 Unconvinced of the CDCR's ability to manage the
medical needs of the state's prison population, the court put the
medical delivery system of the prisons in receivership. 58
2. Coleman and the establishment of unconstitutional
mental health care conditions.
The Coleman prisoner release order follows from CDCR
violations of the Eighth Amendment based on its failure to
provide adequate health care to inmates with mental disorders.59
The Eighth Amendment violation was based on several
51 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *3.
52 Id.
53 Id at *4.
54 Id.
55 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *4.
56 Id at *7.
57 Id.
58 Id at *6-8 (describing San Quentin prison in Marin County, California as not com-
plying at all with the court order); Plata v Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2122657, *7-9 (ND
Cal) (stating that in some prisons medical facilities lacked the equipment to perform
routine exams and many clinics did not meet basic sanitation standards. Worse yet, death
reviews revealed that "repeated gross departures from [] minimal standards of care" lead
to high levels of morbidity for almost any "significant injury, harm, or medical complica-
tion").
59 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at "12.
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inadequacies in the CDCR's handling of patients with mental
illness. Firstly, the court highlighted delays in access to
necessary mental health care. 60 The court specifically noted that
there were "backlogs of 300-400 inmates awaiting transfer to
enhanced outpatient programs."6' Secondly, the court observed
that the CDRC lacked a "systematic program for screening and
evaluating inmates for mental illness."62 The court also found
that the CDCR's supervision of medication use was inadequate
as prescriptions were not refilled in a timely fashion among other
problems. 63 Finally, the court observed that the CDCR's record
keeping was highly disorganized and several treatment plans
were incomplete or nonexistent.64
Despite the extensive efforts of a Special Master appointed
by the court, the CDCR was unable to remedy the constitutional
violations. 65 The CDCR built remedial plans around the Mental
Health Services Delivery System ("MHSDS"). 66 Despite the
60 Id at *13, citing Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282, 1309 (ED Cal 1995).
61 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at "13, quoting Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282,
1309 (ED Cal 1995).
62 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at "13, quoting Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282,
1305 (ED Cal 1995).
63 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at "13, citing Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282,
1306 (ED Cal 1995).
64 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *13, citing Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282,
1314 (ED Cal 1995). See also Coleman v Wilson, 912 F Supp 1282, 1314 (ED Cal 1995)
(stating that in numerous cases, the CDCR transferred inmates between prisons "without
even such medical records as might exist"); Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at * 14 (noting the
CDCR was found deficient in five necessary components for operating an adequate prison
health care system, including proper screening, timely access to appropriate levels of
care, an adequate medical record system, proper administration of psychotropic medica-
tion, and competent staff in sufficient numbers).
65 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *15 (describing the Special Master filing twenty
monitoring reports and the Coleman court issuing over seventy orders concerning matters
at the core of the remedial process; the court's orders primarily concerned creating a
sufficient number of beds in the mental health care delivery system, reducing delays in
transfers to necessary levels of care and ensuring an adequate quantity of staff mem-
bers.).
66 The MHSDS plan was designed to provide four level of care: the Correctional Clin-
ical Case Management Services program (CCCMS or 3CMS), the Enhanced Outpatient
Program (EOP), Mental Health Crisis Bed (MHCB) Placement, and DMH Inpatient Hos-
pital Care. The CCCMS level of care was given to inmates whose symptoms were under
control or in partial remission and could function in the general prison population, ad-
ministrative segregation, or segregated housing units. The EOP level of care was for
inmates suffering from acute onset of a serious mental disorder characterized by in-
creased delusional thinking and hallucination among other symptoms, and who were
unable to function in the general prison population, but did not need twenty-four-hour
care. The MHCB was for inmates who were impaired and/or dangerous to others as a
result of mental illness, or who were suicidal and required twenty-four-hour nursing care.
DMH care was for inmates who could not be successfully treated at a lower level of care.
Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at * 15.
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MHSDS, the CDCR was unable to allocate enough beds at the
Enhanced Outpatient Program, Mental Health Crisis Bed, and
inpatient levels of care.6 7 The court also found that the CDCR's
plans failed to address the state's needs for the future.68
3. "Need-narrowness-intrusiveness" in Coleman.
In issuing its prisoner release order, the three-judge panel
began its analysis by stating that "[f]ederal courts have long
recognized that [prison] population reduction orders may some-
times be necessary to ensure constitutional prison conditions."69
After listening to the opinions of experts and considering other
evidence, the court decided that overcrowding was the primary
cause of the constitutional violations at issue in both Plata and
Coleman.70 Additionally, the evidence led the court to conclude
that overcrowding was such a systematic problem that requiring
the release of prisoners was acceptable under the scope of release
and form of release criteria of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness
inquiry.
a) Scope of release in Coleman. In determining that a
constitutional violation existed, the courts in Plata and Coleman
looked to historical as well as current information about over-
crowding in the entire CDCR system and changes in California's
legal system. The court in Coleman noted that California's prison
population increased by more than 750 percent since 1970,
reaching 160,000 in adult prisons in 2006.71 The court explained
that the growth in California's prison population was due
in large part to the state's adoption of determinate sentencing
67 Id at *16 (noting that, despite the court having issued numerous orders requiring
more mental health care beds, once the state's prison population reached more than
160,000 in 2006, the shortage of space reached a "crisis level").
68 Id.
69 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *28, citing as examples Duran v Elrod, 713 F2d
292, 297 (7th Cir 1983) (upholding a district court's order requiring a reduction in the
population of the Cook County Department of Corrections, finding that the order was
sensitive to the principles of federalism and that the district court acted reasonably to
ease a critical problem of overcrowding); Newman v Alabama, 683 F2d 1312, 1321 (11th
Cir 1983) (finding that since Alabama's county jails were unconstitutionally overcrowded,
a cap on inmate population struck the proper balance between the duty of the district
court to remedy constitutional violations and the right of the State to administer its pris-
on and parole systems).
70 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *62.
71 Id at *19.
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in the 1970s and an inability to prepare inmates for return to
society.72
The court also cited the failure of legislative plans to reduce
unconstitutional overcrowding in issuing its release order. While
California planned on increasing the number of beds and basic
resources in prisons that grew beyond capacity, the CDCR made
no provision for the expansion of medical care space. 73 In re-
sponse to the medical issues presented by overcrowding, Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger issued an emergency proclamation in 2006
that included a proposal for building two new prisons. 74 However,
the California legislature rejected all of the Governor's pro-
posals. 75 Thereafter, Governor Schwarzenegger used his authori-
ty under the California Emergency Services Act to transfer in-
mates to correctional facilities in other states. 76 The lack of ac-
tion by the state legislature and Governor Schwarzenegger's
declaration of a state of emergency supported the court's
determination that unconstitutional overcrowding would con-
tinue. Thus the court used legislative failure to justify its
implementation of a prisoner release order.
Additionally, the court felt the prisoner release order was
justified despite the fact that inmates other than those with med-
ical conditions or mental illnesses would be affected by the in-
junctive relief.77 The court reasoned that any release order would
affect inmates outside of the Plata and Coleman classes and, as a
result, the relief ordered by the court could not be considered
overly broad for that reason alone. 78 Similarly, the court also con-
fronted the fact that ameliorating overcrowding alone may not
improve the quality of health care and other medical services
received by the Coleman and Plata class members. The court
reasoned that the PLRA does not require that the prisoner re-
lease order alone will resolve the constitutional violation.79 In-
stead, the order need only be an element of the remedy. Thus the
court concluded that a system-wide remedy in the form of a per-
72 Id at *20.
73 Id at *22.
74 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *23-24.
75 Id.
76 Id at *24. See also id, citing CCPOA v Schwarzenegger, 163 Cal App 4th 802 (2008)
(noting the proclamation withstood a challenge in state court, in part because
Schwarzenegger's declaration of emergency was in response to conditions that presented
extreme peril to prisoners and others).
77 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *77.
78 Id.
79 Id at *53.
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centage reduction of prisoner population in all CDCR facilities
was appropriate.8 0 In requiring the reduction of the prison popu-
lation, the court relied on the testimony of experts who stated
that the likelihood of bringing the CDCR into compliance with
the Constitution increases as the prison population nears 100
percent of the system's design capacity.81
b) Form of release in Coleman. Despite conceding that
a prisoner release order would affect inmates beyond the mem-
bers of the Plata and Coleman classes, the court held that a
prisoner release order is a permissible form of relief8 2 The court
looked to the Supreme Court's praise of the district court in
Bounds v Smith.8 3 The Coleman court explained that in Bounds
the district court held that the state's failure to provide legal re-
search facilities unconstitutionally denied its inmates access to
courts.8 4 The Supreme Court commended the district court for
fashioning an injunctive remedy that left the state to choose
which method would most "easily and economically" fulfill its
duty.85 Since the three-judge panel in Coleman did not specify
how the state should release its prisoners, the panel compared
the relief it offered in Coleman and Plata to the relief in
Bounds.8 6
80 Id at *76-77, citing Armstrong at 870, quoting Lewis, 518 US at 359, for the propo-
sition that "the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation estab-
lished" and that system-wide relief is only appropriate when the Constitutional injustice
is "widespread enough to justify system wide relief."
81 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *79.
82 Plata, 2007 WL 2122657 at *3 (stating that while the Receivership made some
progress, the court did not have to wait years in order to determine whether the Receiv-
er's plans would succeed or fail).
83 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *77-78.
84 Id at *77, citing Bounds v Smith, 430 US 817, 818 (1977).
85 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *77, quoting Bounds, 430 US at 818-19.
86 See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at "78, *20 (listing numerous options left open to
the state, namely: diverting nonviolent offenders and technical parole violators from
prison, using a risk and needs assessment tool to match inmates with resources and pro-
gramming, expanding rehabilitative programs, reforming California's determinate sen-
tencing system, transferring low-risk prisoners to community-based reintegration facili-
ties, establishing a sentencing commission, reforming parole, creating partnerships be-
tween state and local correction agencies, requiring that all programs be based on solid
research evidence, and promoting public awareness regarding California's prison system).
See also id, quoting Bounds, 430 US at 832-33 (stating that the district court's remedy
.scrupulously respected the limits on [the court's] role" and preserved the prison adminis-
trators' "wide discretion within the bounds of constitutional requirements").
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B. The Common-Law Approach to "Need-Narrowness-
Intrusiveness"
There are significant differences between the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approach to need-narrowness-intrusiveness and
the court's approach under the PLRA in Coleman. The court in
Coleman described the PLRA as the codification of common-law
prisoner release standards.87 This assertion is generally true for
the bedrock principles of the scope and form of release standards.
The major difference, however, between the common-law ap-
proach and Plata and Coleman is the considerations that are
taken into account when analyzing whether the relief is narrow
in scope and form. Specifically, the court in Coleman openly con-
sidered factors beyond the conditions of the prison and prison
system in question while the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, as explained in Rhodes v Chapman, is narrower.88
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach, as described by
the concurrence in Rhodes, dictates that courts consider whether
conditions of confinement, either singly or in combination, are
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.8 9 Additionally,
the concurrence extended the approach to determining whether
prison conditions are humane. 90 While the concurrence in Rhodes
said that contemporary standards should be considered when
determining what constitutes humane prison conditions, the
concurrence suggested a narrow approach to considering what
constitutes humane prison standards. Rather than considering
societal norms about what constitutes humane treatment, the
concurrence relied on expert testimony and facts about prison
conditions to determine what constitutes humane treatment for
inmates.91 In essence, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach
seems to consider whether prisons are humane in light of other
prisons, rather than in terms of societal standards as a whole. 92
By limiting courts' considerations to the situations within pris-
ons, the approach to prisoner release orders exemplified in
87 Coleman, 2009 2430820 at *30 (quoting the legislative record describing the PLRA
as "not a departure from current jurisprudence concerning injunctive relief").
88 See Rhodes, 452 US at 362-64 (Brennan concurring).
89 Id at 363 (Brennan concurring). See also Laaman v Helgemoe, 437 F Supp 269,
322-23 (D NH 1977) (stating even if no single condition of confinement would be uncon-
stitutional in itself, "exposure to the cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject
inmates to cruel and unusual punishment").
90 Rhodes, 452 US at 362--64 (Brennan concurring).
91 Id at 363-64.
92 Id.
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Rhodes severely limits the factors courts can take into account
when analyzing the scope and form of relief elements of need-
narrowness-intrusiveness.
C. The Significance of the Different Approaches-Among
Common Law, Coleman, and Plata-to the "Need-
Narrowness-Intrusiveness" Requirement
The factors that a court considers under the need-
narrowness-intrusiveness test can affect whether the relief of-
fered is deemed appropriate in scope and form. Under the scope
element of need-narrowness-intrusiveness, different con-
siderations can affect whether courts determine that prison
conditions are constitutionally adequate. Additionally, the ap-
proaches also differ as to whether the relief offered is sufficiently
limited to the injuries alleged by plaintiffs. Concerning the form
of relief component of the need-narrowness-intrusiveness test,
the PLRA makes it clear that courts should consider the effect on
the public when issuing prisoner release orders.9 3 This require-
ment, however, is not an element of the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach which is largely confined to considering
conditions within prisons or prison systems.94 This open-ended
statutory command gives the court considerable leeway in
determining whether prisoner release orders are permissible.
1. Scope of relief: Coleman and the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approaches to constitutionally adequate
conditions and limited scope of relief.
Whether courts can consider conditions external to prisons
or prison systems can have a great effect on whether a court
determines a prison to have constitutionally inadequate condi-
tions. In order for courts to determine whether the scope of relief
offered is appropriate, the court must first recognize a con-
stitutional violation. In the case of prisons, courts agree on the
general requisites that should be used to determine whether
prison conditions meet the Eighth Amendment's requirements.
The words "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment are
very open and vague. Courts have interpreted the Eighth
Amendment as only requiring that prisons provide the
93 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A).
94 Rhodes, 452 US at 363 (1981) (Brennan concurring).
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"minimum level" of medical care. 95 The Supreme Court has
described the Amendment as flexible and dynamic.96 According
to the Court, the Eighth Amendment is aimed at avoiding the
infliction of unnecessary pain or disproportionate punishment for
a crime, 97 and that its meaning is derived from "evolving stan-
dards of decency." 98
An examination of the court's interpretation of the PLRA in
Coleman and Plata and the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach reveals that courts have offered different standards for
determining whether prison conditions are constitutionally
adequate. While the court in Coleman and the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach both recognize that the Eighth Amend-
ment standards is not static, they offer vastly different ap-
proaches as to what factors should be considered in determining
whether a prison system violates a constitutional right.99 In
Coleman the court openly cited the poor economy and potential
reductions on prison spending as influencing its determination
that the CDCR would not be able to remedy constitutionally in-
adequate prisons.100 Thus the court in Coleman considered the
constitutionality of prison conditions in light of circumstances
beyond the prison and prison system at issue. The court was will-
ing to consider how factors like legislative gridlock or a declining
economy influence the constitutionality of prison conditions.
Conversely, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach only
takes into consideration how prison conditions influence prison-
ers' circumstances.10 1 Unlike the Coleman approach, the totality-
of-the-circumstances approach is entirely inward looking and
judges the adequacy of prison conditions on the current internal
workings of prisons and prison systems. That is, the totality-of-
the-circumstances approach asks whether the conditions of a
given prison, when taken together, are unconstitutional. The
approach does not look beyond the conditions of the prison at
issue. Thus, in determining whether prison conditions are un-
constitutional, the approach does not consider whether a legisla-
tive or executive proposal will alleviate constitutional violations.
95 See Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *4.
96 Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153, 171 (1976).
9' Id at 173; Coker v Georgia, 433 US 584, 592 (1977).
98 Trop v Dulles, 365 US 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
99 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *2-3; Rhodes, 452 US at 346.
1oo Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *2.
101 Rhodes, 452 US at 362-64.
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Additionally, the court's approach in Coleman and the totali-
ty-of-the-circumstances approach can lead to different results
when considering whether the remedy is limited to the injuries
brought by the plaintiffs in court. Arguably, this is where the
relief in Coleman differs from the relief offered by the Court in
Bounds. In Bounds, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach
led the Court to fashion a remedy that would only affect mem-
bers of the suing class. The Court held that prisons in North
Carolina would have to give inmates adequate access to the
means necessary to file legal claims. 10 2 Of course, providing ac-
cess to courts for prisoners may have added additional costs to
the prison system that would have indirectly affected taxpayers
in the state. Still, the ordered relief would have primarily affect-
ed prisoners who were members of the Bounds plaintiff class.
In sharp contrast, the court in Coleman openly conceded
that its relief would affect prisoners who did not suffer physical
or mental illness. 10 3 This is problematic because, as the court in
Coleman noted, the relief granted should be as narrow as possi-
ble in scope in remedying the ills complained of by the plaintiff
class. 10 4 Thus the prisoner release orders in Coleman may fail
under the scope of relief prong because of their breadth.
2. Form of relief: Coleman and the "totality-of-the-
circumstances" approach to public welfare.
The PLRA clearly requires courts to consider how a prisoner
release order will affect the public while the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach does not have a similar requirement.105
The responsibility for considering public welfare is a statutory
charge that gives courts tremendous leeway in balancing wheth-
er a prisoner release order is adequate in form and sufficiently
narrow. Congress has given courts very little guidance as to what
public-interest factors should be considered. Such an open statu-
tory charge can lead to varying conclusions among courts as to
whether prisoner release orders should be issued.
This is especially problematic when considering that the
court in Coleman merges the public welfare test into the form of
relief analysis. As written in the PLRA, the court is to consider
the public interest after determining that a prison violates a con-
102 Bounds, 430 US at 818-19.
103 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *77.
104 Id at *76-77.
105 Compare 18 USC § 3626(a)(1)(A), with Rhodes, 452 US at 362-64.
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stitutional right and when trying to fashion a remedy that is
sufficiently limited in scope and form. Congress has entered a
vast amount of subjectivity into the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness inquiry by permitting the public-interest analysis
to influence the determination of whether a prisoner release
order is narrow in form.
The significance of this subjectivity is evident when decon-
structing the court's declaration of the remedy in Coleman in
comparison to the relief the Supreme Court praised in Bounds.
The court in Coleman claims that its remedy is sufficiently nar-
row in light of Bounds because it leaves the means of implement-
ing a prisoner release order to the governor and legislators. 10 6
The situation in Bounds, however, is distinguishable from Plata
and Coleman. In Bounds the court considered whether prisons
gave inmates adequate ability to access courts. While the court
noted the creation of adequate law libraries as a constitutionally
acceptable method of insuring inmates had access to courts, the
court left other options available to the state. Thus, by confining
their decision to whether prisons adequately remedied the viola-
tion of a fundamental constitutional right, the court in Bounds
issued relief that was narrow in form. 10 7
The Bounds decision, however, may not be comparable to
Coleman because the lower court in Bounds did not consider fac-
tors external to prisons in reaching its decision. This is largely
because the totality-of-the-circumstances approach does not rec-
ognize public welfare as an element of need-narrowness-
intrusiveness. Greater still, the effect on the public was not di-
rectly relevant to determining whether prisoners should have
access to courts. Arguably, if the lower court had considered such
issues the Supreme Court may have deemed the order inappro-
priate in form. The Coleman court made a very different decision
than the court in Bounds by considering factors beyond prison
conditions in issuing its prisoner release orders.
The consideration of public welfare as part of the form of re-
lief inquiry makes the court's determination that its relief meets
the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard questionable. While
the court left the method for releasing prisoners open to the
state, the issuance of the order confined the means by which the
unconstitutional lack of medical and mental health care could be
remedied. The court's opinion makes it clear that considering the
106 Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at *77-78.
107 Bounds, 430 US at 818-19.
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effect on the public of the release order led to the issuance of the
relief. The court decided that the state and local communities
would be able to cope with an influx of physically and mentally
ill citizens. 08 This is especially problematic when considering
that the legislative history of the PLRA reveals that Congress
enacted the statute in part to curb federal courts placing the
burden of costly injunctive relief on states. In issuing its release
order the court used considerations beyond those that would be
permitted under the totality-of-the-circumstances test to issue a
prisoner release order.
III. THE SOLUTION
The PLRA approach to need-narrowness-intrusiveness, as
exemplified by the court in Plata and Coleman, is clearly differ-
ent than the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. The fact
that the court in Coleman believes that it is merely applying
common-law principles of injunctive relief reveals that courts are
unclear as to how need-narrowness-intrusiveness should be de-
fined under the PLRA. Arguably, neither the Coleman approach
or the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate given
the need for states to reconfigure their prison systems in light of
the current economic recession. Therefore, an ideal approach to
the PLRA need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard would offer
relief that is sufficiently narrow in scope and form while being
sensitive to the constitutional rights of prisoners.
A. Scope of Relief: Ensuring That System-Wide Relief Benefits
Members of the Plaintiff Class
In order to meet the requirement that relief be sufficiently
narrow in scope, the court should only issue injunctive relief that
is certain to benefit members of the plaintiff class. As evidenced
in Bounds, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach embodies
this principle by looking solely into the conditions of prisons
when fashioning relief. The approach in Coleman, however, is
slightly more ambivalent as to whether relief offered will directly
affect the plaintiff class. It is certainly true that a prisoner re-
lease order is likely to affect persons other than members of the
plaintiff class. Yet, the court in Coleman used this rationale to
defend issuing a prisoner release order that could have no impact
on persons suffering from an unconstitutional lack of health care.
10s Coleman, 2009 WL 2430820 at 167-78.
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The court's prisoner release order gave the CDCR too much dis-
cretion as to which prisoners could be released. Thus, the CDCR
could decrease the population of prisons to the court-stipulated
level while not improving the medical care available to inmates.
The court could solve this problem by requiring the CDCR to
release inmates who are members of the plaintiff class. Clearly,
if the CDCR releases people who suffer from inadequate health
care as a result of prison overcrowding, these persons will no
longer be subject to unconstitutional prison conditions. Of course,
a court placing such a requirement on a prisoner release order is
likely to be too restrictive under the form of relief element of the
need-narrow-intrusiveness requirement. The court would clearly
be restricting legislative or executive decision making by stating
exactly who can be released.
Still, as a second option, the court in Coleman could preserve
the scope of relief requirement by maintaining that the CDCR
must release prisoners in such a way that will alleviate the nega-
tive impact unconstitutional overcrowding has on prison health
care. This requirement would ensure that members of the plain-
tiff class are the targets of the prisoner release orders. Addition-
ally, this would give legislatures and executives enough discre-
tion in determining how to implement a prisoner release order.
Rather than depend on obscure numbers about desirable prison
population size set by the court, this approach would focus direct-
ly on how prison populations affect prisoners. Thus, the court
would succeed in offering system-wide relief that is sufficiently
narrow in breadth as a means of remedying overcrowding.
B. Form of Relief: The Economy, the Public-Interest
Requirement under the PLRA, and Confining Judicial
Discretion
The court should take into consideration whether a prisoner
release order is in the best interest of the state economically.
Undoubtedly, the PLRA addition of public welfare as a consider-
ation for issuing injunctive relief is significant. Yet considering
that the term "public welfare" encompasses such a broad domain,
courts that follow the example set by the three-judge panel in
Coleman are not likely to be able to consider all the ways in
which the public could be affected by a prisoner release order.
Additionally, the court incorrectly used the public-welfare
element of the PLRA to consider economic factors in determin-
ing whether the form of release satisfied the need-narrowness-
intrusiveness test. Despite this error, economic factors should
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always be considered in determining whether a court's injunctive
relief is sufficiently narrow in form. By no means does this
suggest that courts should perform an in-depth analysis of state
budgets. Instead, courts should consider evidence presented by
the state and special circumstances like the current economic
decline in determining whether granted relief is narrow in form.
Thus courts should find a medium between the Coleman
approach and the totality-of-the-circumstances approach by
letting states consider the best financial means that can be used
to improve the conditions of prisons.
Of course, this approach may be problematic because it
would permit the CDCR to maintain unconstitutional conditions
if it is financially unable to remedy these situations. This prob-
lem, however, will exist regardless of whether the court demands
that the CDCR remedy prison conditions. If a court binds a legis-
lature or executive to give relief that is economically unviable
then the relief granted is not only too broad in form but it is also
impractical. The financial condition of states will always influ-
ence the quality of conditions that prison facilities can supply.
Moreover, courts considering the economic condition of
states may actually improve the ability of prison systems to give
inmates constitutionally adequate conditions. In Coleman, for
example, the court chose not to let the role that the declining
economy played in preventing the completion of new prisons
influence its decision. If courts issue prisoner release orders
without taking into account such considerations states may not
try to build additional prisons or alleviate unconstitutional
prison conditions. Instead, executives or legislatures may rely on
courts to regulate prison populations through release orders. Not
only would this allow states to abdicate this largely legislative
and executive authority to the judicial branch but it may also
lead to a strain on judicial resources. Therefore, the con-
sideration of economic effects on prison conditions may improve
the constitutional quality of detention centers.
CONCLUSION
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 offers a statutory
framework for when courts can issue prisoner release orders. The
PLRA, however, varies significantly from the common-law
approach to injunctive relief described as the totality-of-the-
circumstances approach. The breadth of considerations that the
Coleman approach allows in determining need-narrowness-
intrusiveness permits courts to issue prisoner release orders that
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are not sufficiently narrow in scope or form. Conversely, the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach is not flexible enough
given the updated method for issuing injunctive relief offered in
the PLRA and the current economic decline. Therefore, courts
should issue prisoner release orders in such a way that will
respect the need-narrowness-intrusiveness standard and allow
legislators and executives to fashion cost-effective remedies to
unconstitutional prison conditions.
